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Abstract 
Anglophone Cameroon is the present-day North West and South West 
(English Speaking) regions of Cameroon herein referred to as No-So. These 
regions of Cameroon have been restive since 2016 in what is popularly 
referred to as the Anglophone crisis. The crisis has been transformed to a 
separatist movement, with some Anglophones clamoring for an independent 
No-So, re-baptized as “Ambazonia”. The purpose of the study is to illuminate 
the geopolitical perspective of the conflict which has been evaded by many 
scholars. Most scholarly write-ups have rather focused on the causes, course, 
consequences and international interventions in the crisis, with little attention 
to the geopolitical undertones. In terms of methodology, the paper makes use 
of qualitative data analysis. Unlike previous research works that link the 
unfolding of the crisis to Anglophone marginalization, historical and cultural 
difference, the findings from this paper reveals that the strategic location of 
No-So, the presence of resources, demographic considerations and other 
geopolitical parameters are proving to be responsible for the heightening of 
the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon and in favour of the quest for an 
independent Ambazonia. This article however upholds that the No-So is still 
part of Cameroon’s territorial space, considering the fact that Ambazonia is 
not internationally recognized as a sovereign state. 
 
Keywords: Geopolitics, Territoriality, Anglophone Crisis, Ambazonia, The 
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Introduction 
This article seeks to elucidate on the geopolitical perspective on the 
Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. It is therefore important to have an 
understanding of the word geopolitics and other related terms. The term 
“geopolitics” was coined by a Swedish political scientist- Rudolf Kjellen at 
the beginning of the 20th century. He defined geopolitics as ‘the theory of the 
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state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space’ (Cahnman, 1943: 
57). Dijkink (1996) defined it is a scientific explanation of the power and 
security policy of states on the basis of geographical position and/or natural 
resources. According to Toal (cited in Efferink, 2009), geopolitics can also be 
regarded as a discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on 
state competition and the geographical dimensions of power. Meanwhile, 
Dodds (2007) upholds that geopolitics is all about the visualization of a map, 
about placing one‘s feet squarely in history and geography, while keeping 
one‘s eyes upon a speculative future. A geopolitical analysis can also be 
assessed as ‘an intellectual tradition, as an expression of state interest, and 
finally as an expression of identity politics’ (Guzzini, 2010: 14).‘Geopolitics 
deals with concepts such as power, politics, and policy, and space, place, and 
territory, and embraces an innumerable multitude of interactions within these 
various fields’ (Jones, Jones & Woods, 2004: 170). The Inter-American Wiki 
gives a simpler definition of geopolitics; as, ‘the struggle over hegemony in 
places and spaces’ (Mirko & Wehrmann, 2015). 
Based on the above definitions of geopolitics, a strong correlation can 
be seen between geography and history. Thus, geopolitics can equally be 
considered to be ‘a combination of history (political processes) and 
geography, competing authorities striving to exercise power, occupy, and 
administer space’ (Toal, 1996: 2).The history of Cameroon from 1972 to 
contemporary times has been characterized by what is generally referred to as 
“the Anglophone problem” or “the Anglophone crisis”, which heightened after 
2016. In a typical geopolitical expression, the crisis is marked by territorial 
contestation (that is; between the separatists and the government over No-So), 
a phenomenon otherwise known in geopolitical studies as “territoriality”.  
‘Territoriality is derived from the word ‘‘territory’’, which denotes a 
demarcated geographic area governed and controlled by a political institution’ 
(Gottmann, 1973: 5, 26).According to Storey (2017), territoriality can be 
defined as the process whereby individuals or groups lay claim over a 
particular territory, it reflects a way in which space is imagined and how it can 
serve useful political functions. Territorial thinking is the production of 
territories, and the employment of territorial strategies is bound up with 
maintaining power or resisting the imposition of power by the dominant group 
(Storey 2017). This article shall focus on No-So as the contested territorial 
space, with the separatists striving to create an independent state called 
“Ambazonia”. Besides the historical perspective, this drive is equally 
triggered by the presence of natural resources, its strategic geographical 
location, a reasonable population size, all of which can guarantee the status 
and survival of an independent nation. Meanwhile, the Cameroon government, 
on the other hand, remains resolute in defending the territorial integrity of the 
nation.  
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The quest for a separate state (Ambazonia) by Anglophone Cameroonian 
separatists has evolved over time. Although there are substantial publications 
on this subject especially by Sociologists, anthropologists, historians, political 
scientists, lawyers and journalists, (Lunn & Brooke, 2019; Lohkoko, 2013; 
Ngoh, 2019; Chereji & Lohkoko, 2012; Fonchingong, 2011; Konings & 
Nyamnjoh, 1997), most of these studies centered on the causes, manifestation 
and impact of the Anglophone Problem. This study is a paradigm shift from 
the existing abundant literature, as it props into illuminating the geopolitical 
undertones of the crisis. Within this perspective, investigating the ways in 
which the presence of natural resources, the geography and demography of 
No-So serves as key motivating factors to the Anglophone separatists shall be 
at the center of analysis. Historical memories, as well as some aspects of 
foreign interventions shall equally be analyzed from the geopolitical prism. It 
is however important to have a glimpse of the origin of the transformation of 
No-So into a contested territorial space as referred to by the separatists as 
Ambazonia. 
 
1. The Origin Of “Ambazonia” As A Territorial Construct  
‘Etymologically, the term ‘Ambazonia’ is derived from the word 
‘Ambozes’, the local name for the Ambas Bay area at the mouth of the Wouri 
river’ (Ngoh, 2004: 6). In 1858, the Ambas Bay was settled by the English 
Baptist Missionaries led by Alfred Saker. The territory was renamed by the 
missionaries as “Victoria”, which is present day “Limbe”, in the South West 
Region of Cameroon (Burnley, 2016). The name Ambazonia was first 
expressed as a territorial construct in 1985 by the eminent Anglophone lawyer 
and first president of the Cameroon Bar Association-Fon Gorji-Dinka 
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997), after the Paul Biya’s (current president of 
Cameroon) government changed the name of the country from the "United 
Republic of Cameroon" back to the pre-reunification name of the French 
Cameroon; that is, “La Republique du Cameroun” (The Republic of 
Cameroon) as the country is presently known. In the view of some, particularly 
in the English section of Cameroon, this meant the dissolution of the 1961 
union between the English and French sections of Cameroon. As a result, Fon 
Dinka called for the Southern Cameroons (No-So) to become independent and 
to be re-baptized as the “Republic of Ambazonia” (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 
1997). 
The name Ambazonia was declared to represent a timely intervention 
of the people of Southern Cameroons to return the statehood of the former 
British Southern Cameroons territory (Ambazonia, in Wikipedia, 2019). Also, 
the appellation Ambazonia was used to inject a sense of distinctive sovereign 
identity. Since 1985, several emancipationist entities and organizations have 
emerged (such as the Southern Cameroons National Council (NCNC), The 
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Ambazonian Interim Government (IG), The Ambazonian Governing Council 
(AGovC), etc), advocating for the "restoration of independence” of this 
territory. It is reported that in 1992, Fon Gorji-Dinka, on behalf of the 
“Republic of Ambazonia” sued the Republic of Cameroon and President Paul 
Biya on the main charge of the Republic of Cameroon's illegal and forcible 
occupation since the 1984 dissolution of the United Republic of Cameroon 
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). 
With the creation of the Southern Cameroons National councils 
(S.C.N.C) in 1995, it secured Southern Cameroons (Ambazonia) a place in the 
“Unrepresented People Organization” (U.N.P.O) in a bid to seek international 
recognition. Also, ‘since 1995, several Anglophone delegations have been sent 
to the United Nations’ (Lohkoko, 2013: 29), but as reported by Konings & 
Nyamnjoh (1997), such efforts to the UNO went in vain. Meanwhile, in 1999, 
the SCNC faction led by then Justice Ebong Alobwede took hostage of the 
Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) in Buea, and declared the 
independence of the Federal Democratic Republic of Southern Cameroon 
(Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). Whether Federal Democratic Republic of 
Southern Cameroon or the Federal Republic of Ambazonia, both appellations 
make reference to the same territorial space. Ambazonia was further 
popularized and internationalized as a territorial construct on October 1, 2017, 
when the Anglophone diaspora led Interim Government (IG) of Ambazonia 
headed by Sisiku Ayuk Julius Tabe (presently serving life sentence in 
Cameroon) unilaterally declared the independence of the country called 
Ambazonia, which was followed by mass civilian demonstrations across the 
North West and South West Regions of Cameron in acclamation 
(EUROACTIV, 2017). The conflict over the No-So heightened thereafter. It 
will however be important to present the geopolitical stakes of the crisis.  
 
2. The Geopolitical Stakes Of The Contested Territorial Space 
The Anglophone regions remain strategic to both the state of 
Cameroon and to the separatists. No-So is endowed with natural resources, 
fertile soils and climate which encourage extensive plantation agriculture of 
rubber, bananas, palm oil and tea. The No-So hosts some of the biggest 
Agricultural corporations in Cameroon. This part of the territory is also rich in 
timber and petroleum products (Lohkoko, 2013), and constitutes part of 
Cameroon’s land and maritime frontiers. Thus, considering the fact that this 
study seeks to illuminate and provide deeper understanding of the geopolitical 
context of the Anglophone crisis, this section investigates the geopolitical 
stakes of the regions on the global, continental and local scales. 
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2.1.It’s Geography 
Geographically, No-So is located west of the Mungo River. The 
territory is characterized by a series of volcanoes like the Mount Oku, Kupe 
Manenguba volcano, and the Mount Fako (Mt. Cameroon) with rich volcanic 
soils, making the regions rich in plantation agriculture. The Mt. Fako is the 
highest mountain in western Africa and the 28th highest in Africa as a whole 
(Gabche & smaith, 2006). From Manyu Division, the disputed South West 
region shares border with Nigeria to the western part of Cameroon. 
The Menchum Fall in the North West region was reputed as one of the 
most powerful waterfalls in Africa in the 1960’s, although this changed due to 
deforestation and a resultant drop in water tables (Acho, 2017). However, the 
Ambazonian government considers the Menchum fall as a potential natural 
energy endowment. According to the AGovC, the Menchum fall, once 
harnessed after independence would provide the necessary uninterrupted 
electricity not only to Ambazonia, but enough to sell to even ‘neighboring 
Cameroon’ and Nigeria – both of whom suffer from inadequate electricity 
supply (Ayaba Cho Luca, for the Ambazonia Governing Council, July 16, 
2019). The geography of the contested No-So therefore remained deeply 
rooted in the minds of the Ambazonia leadership as declared by the then 
Ambazonian Interim president- Sisiko Ayuk Julius Tabe during his 2017 “End 
of year address to the people of Ambazonia” over the Southern Cameroons 
Television in the following words; “…let’s transform unity from the virtuality 
of social media platforms into realities… I mean the type of unity that we 
witnessed in the glorious days of the 22nd of September and the 1st of October 
2017. The unity when our people rose as one; … from every little corner of 
our land; from the borders of Mwa, to Akwaya and down to Bakassi [oil rich 
and border region with Nigeria], from the hilltop of Oku [on the Gulf of Guinea 
volcanic line] to the plains of Ndop [the agricultural hub of the region], from 
the shorelines of Victoria [along the Gulf of Guinea] to the mighty mount Fako 
[highest Mountain in West Africa]. Yes, unite, from the heartland of Manyu 
[hotspot of resistance and border region with Nigeria] where our people have 
shown tremendous resolve, and to the banks of the River Mungo [borderline 
with francophone Cameroon] where even nature reminds us that we no longer 
belong together. …” (Southern Cameroons Television, December 31, 2017). 
This goes a long way to affirm the thesis that geographical images have 
become deeply rooted in political languages, and that political thoughts and 
geography are inevitably and irrevocably inter-twined (Young, 1987). It is 
therefore not surprising that the separatist leadership takes into account not 
only the historical and linguistic compositions of No-So, but also its 
geopolitical mapping. 
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2.1.1.   The Gulf Of Guinea Factor 
Cameroon’s coastline lies on the Bight of Biafra, part of the Gulf of 
Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. Part of the Anglophone Regions (the Limbe 
Coastline) lies within the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is the world’s 
richest and under exploited place. It holds about 35% of the world’s total 
petroleum reserves and blessed with many mineral and other natural resources 
such as diamonds, tin, bitumen, copper, manganese, gold, phosphide granite, 
gas just to mention these, as well as very rich rain forests which accounts for 
20% of the world’s total rainforest reserves (Abubakar, 2016).The Gulf of 
Guinea has a volcanic region known as the ‘Island Arc’ which is aligned with 
the Cameroon line of volcanoes (World Atlas, 2019), consisting of six 
offshore volcanic swells beginning with the Mount Cameroon in the South 
West Region (Kevin, 2001). 
Due to geographical proximity and geopolitical linkages, the Gulf of 
Guinea member states have constituted a commission (made up of Angola, 
Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe) (Gulf of Guinea 
Commission, 2019), through which they cooperate significantly in their 
foreign and security policies. Hence, today, the Gulf of Guinea has a more 
geopolitical and geostrategic dimension, especially as a choke point for the 
shipping/transportation of oil extracted in the Niger Delta, as well as goods to 
and from Central and Southern Africa (Europa, 2018). As a town that lies 
along the Ambas Bay in the Gulf of Guinea (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019), 
the Ambazonian government places Limbe at the core of their geopolitical 
web. According to the Ambazonian Interim government (IG), the town of 
Limbe is the link between West and Central Africa, strategically located in the 
armpit of Africa. Thus, the development of a deep-seaport in the town would 
assist the flow of goods to and from ‘the country’, making Ambazonia a major 
exporter of Agricultural products, considering the abundance of food and cash 
crops in the territory (https://psacs.org/what-we-do/ambazonia-natural-
resources/ of 2019). 
Also, the Ambazonian government valorizes the Limbe Atlantic 
coastline which according to them is rich in marine life and fishery potentials. 
The IG believes that fishing could be a major form of employment to the 
population, with an estimation of over 160.000tons of fish produced annually 
(www.ambazoniagov.org/index.phhp/state/fako-county, 2019). Fully 
cognizance of the active economic, diplomatic and military competition 
among the great powers (United States, Europe, China, Japan, India, Russia 
etc) in the region (Osaretin, 2011), the AGovC uses the Gulf of Guinea as a 
bargaining chip to attract the attention of the USA, for the role of the United 
State is increasing in the region, centered not only on securing the region’s 
natural resources but also on its bourgeoning explosive markets (Ibid). Ayaba 
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Cho Lucas (the commander in Chief of the Ambazonia Defense Force (ADF) 
and the leader of the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC)) in reaction to 
the life sentence slammed on Sisiku Ayuk Julius Tabe by the Cameroon 
government, declared “…the sentencing of our leaders was a slap on the face 
of the Americans… because the Americans have been the principal proponent 
of a negotiated settlement …   the only way American foreign interest can be 
served in the Gulf of Guinea is the recognition of Ambazonia, the only country 
that can ensure stability in the Gulf of Guinea, that can ensure international 
diplomacy… getting Ambazonia recognized is for the best interest of the 
international community…”(Ayaba Cho Lucas, August 25, 2019).  
 
2.2.       Natural Resources 
‘Sovereignty includes the right to extract and use resources’ (Flint, 
2006: 137) and ‘states have to boost the development of their economies 
through the use of natural resources’ (Kurecic, 2015: 2). Historically, most 
secession struggles in Africa (Katanga in Congo, Biafra in Nigeria etc as 
examples) have been linked to the presence of natural resources. The contested 
territory is endowed with a plethora of natural resources. It can be argued that 
presence of the natural resources remains a major driving force of those 
fighting for an independent Ambazonia. This is beautifully expressed in the 
“Ambazonian Anthem” in the following words; “… Here in our nation 
flowing with milk and honey…” (Millan Atem, September 16, 2017). Some of 
these perceived natural resources (milk and honey as referred) include; 
Petroleum, timber, rich soils for plantation agriculture, minerals, just to 
mention these.  Blessed with natural resources therefore, the separatists 
believe that if exploited after independence, it would guarantee the economic 
sustainability and auto-centric development of Ambazonia. Below is a map 
representing the spatial distribution of economic zones in the anticipated 
Ambazonia as designed by the Ambazonian government and pasted on their 
website.  
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Spatial Economic Zones of the Restive Anglophone Regions of Cameroon 
Source :https://www.ambazoniagov.org/images/Spatial_Economic-
Development.pnd.Retrieved August 22, 2019 
. 
2.2.1.   Forest Reserves 
The presence of forest reserves in the contested No-So is equally 
valorized by the Ambazonian leadership. Following information from the 
official website of the Ambazonian Interim Government (IG), the Kupe 
Muanenguba ‘county’ (in the South West Region) is dominated by dense 
equatorial forest, estimating that there is still a large amount of virgin forest 
mostly on the slopes of mount Kupe in the Tombel “Local Government Area” 
(LGA), with huge forest reserves around the same locality. The IG decries the 
extensive exploitation of timber from this part of “their territory” by the 
Cameroon government, but remains hopeful that despite this, Kupe 
Muanenguba still has a huge potential for timber exploitation 
(www.ambazoniagov.org/index.php/state/kupe-muanenguba-county, 2019). 
Furthermore, the IG estimates that forest reserves are found in all the three 
LGA in Ambazonia, and encompasses the largest cloud of forest in West-
Central Africa. Other earmarked reserves included the Ijim and Kom-Bum 
forest reserve, Kom-Wum forest reserve which spans from Belo in Boyo 
division to Menchum Division, with indications of other exploitable forests in 
the Manyu, Lebialem and Menka forest reserves, all found in No-So. To add, 
the IG’s resource records has it that the Korup National Park in Ndian covering 
an area of 1,260km2 of mostly pristine forest is reputed as one of Africa’s 
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oldest and richest rainforests in terms of flora and fauna diversity, attracting 
over 100.000 tourists to the Ndian Division annually 
(www.ambazoniagov.org). 
 
2.2.2. Mineral Resources 
The Ambazonian Interim Government ascertains the presence of 
mineral resources in the Kupe Muanengba ‘County’, including eight sand 
quarries, six pozzolana quarries, one pool paint, two mineral water sources 
and iron ore, the growing presence of world renowned Panja pepper as a cash 
crop along the volcanic flanks of the Mt. Kupe Muanenguba. Also, Basalt, 
commonly called “the black stone” was believed to be found in the Njinikom 
municipality in the North West Region. The IG equally projects the 
availability of gold in Misaje and Mamfe, iron ore, diamond, gold and 
gemstones located in Mayo Binka, and uranium in some localities. Again, they 
perceive the presence of limestone and marbles in Moko, Mbalangi in the 
South West Region, nepheline synenite located in Mamfe, as well as abundant 
granite and basalt (www.ambazoniagov.org). Believing in the presence of 
natural resources in No-So, the Ambazonian government remained optimistic 
for the survival of an independent nation.  
 
2.2.3. Limbe and the Petroleum factor 
The question of oil has become one of the most vital in all countries. 
Its importance is such that even the most solid political alliances in the world 
are subordinate to it. Thus, Oil probably has the clearest effect on conflict 
proneness (Kurecic, 2015).The contested zone hosts one of the largest oil and 
gas companies in Africa known in its French acronym SONARA (Societe 
Nationale de Raffinage), located in Limbe in the South West region of 
Cameroon. Founded in 1973, SONARA owns and operates the only crude oil 
refinery in Cameroon and produces butane, gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, fuel 
oil and distillate, with the capacity of over two million tons a year. SONARA 
products are consumed in the national international markets (SONARA, 
2019). Petroleum accounts for more than 50% of the Cameroon’s total export 
(Trading Economics, 2019).Meanwhile, according to Ayuk Julius Tabe in an 
interview granted to Lowell Telecommunication Corporation (in USA) in 
2017,the Limbe oil wealth [which he referred to as Ambazonian oil] accounts 
for 60% of Cameroon’s GDP (https://youtube.be/gvislA5rnek, of Sept. 25, 
2017). This view was re-echoed by his successor, Samuel Ikome Sakoin 2018 
over the Rudaw TV based in Washington DC in the USA 
(https://youtube.be/s4oXs7L7L0U, 2018). 
Furthermore, the “Ayuk Tabe and Co Solidarity Organization” (An 
organization formed to secure the release of the jailed Ambazonian president 
and his cabinet) projects Ambazonia as the sixth largest oil producer in Sub-
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Saharan Africa, hoping to provide significant opportunities for exploration 
companies once independent is attained. The organization reveals the presence 
of millions of barrels in reserve of fossil fuels in Rio del Rey as well as in 
other places like Miselele basins, Mamfe and Bakassi Peninsular 
(https://psacs.org). This is used as a bargain by the Ambazonian leadership to 
source for foreign support via funding in exchange for exploration rights and 
business deals in a free Ambazonia. 
The opportunity to loot or exploit resources is crucial for the possibility 
of an emergence of and/or sustainability of violent rebellions. This explains 
why the Ambazonian government had always sought for the possibility of 
trading ‘their’ resources for financial and or military support of the war to their 
favor. This equally brings to mind the secret agreement signed between a 
Canadian private company, Kilimanjaro Capital Ltd and a clandestine 
Separatist group in on November 1, 2012. According to a statement by 
Kilimanjaro Capital Ltd; “Kilimanjaro Capital Ltd… is pleased to announce 
that on 1 November 2012, it signed a formal Oil and Mineral Right Assignment 
with the Government of Southern Cameroons. Their region contains known 
petroleum reserves… The Assignment Agreement grants exclusive rights to 
cover an area of approximately 43,000 square kilometers… ”(Ngoh, 2019: 
388).In 2013, the CEO of Kilimanjaro Capital Ltd, Rashid Zulfikar appointed 
Ebenezer Akwanga (an Anglophone Cameroonian) as a member of the 
Advisory Board of the company. According to the 2017 report by the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), Ebenezer Akwanga was the commander of 
one of the rebel militia groups operating in the South West Region called the 
“Southern Cameroons Defence Forces” (SOCADEF) (Ibid).  
 
2.2.4 Agro-industrial potentials 
The South West region hosts the biggest Para-state Corporation in 
Cameroon; the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC). The CDC is an 
Agro-Industrial Enterprise created in 1946 to acquire, develop and operate 
extensive plantations of tropical crops. The corporation grows three tropical 
crops namely Rubber, Oil Palm and Banana, with its headquarters on Limbe 
in the South West Regions. Its plantations cover a total of approximately 
41,000 Hectares of land The corporation operate 9 Rubber Estates, Oil Palm 
Estates, 5 Rubber Factories and 2 Palm Oil Mills. It constitutes a workforce of 
over 22.000 employees, making it the second highest employer after the state 
of Cameroon (Cameroon in Business, 2016). 
In the course of the crisis, the separatist fighters ensured the permanent 
closure of the CDC in a bid to cripple the government economically. As 
reported by the International Crisis Group, in July 2018, the Cameroon 
Employers Association (GICAM) estimated the value of losses incurred by 
the CDC at FCFA 269 billion (€410 million) (International Crisis group, May 
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2, 2019). This was achieved via brutal treatment of the plantation workers. In 
November 2018, CDC workers saw their fingers chopped off in Tiko 
(Cameroon Daily Journal, November, 2018), and on February 19, 2019, at 
least six others had their fingers chopped off still in Tiko, South West region 
(Journal du Cameroun, February 19, 2019). Thus, due to threats from 
separatists, plantation workers had to abandon work, as confirmed by the 
General Manager of the CDC in January 2019 in the following words, “In 
most of the estates, the workers have abandoned work; the crops such as 
bananas, rubber, palm, now have been overgrown by grass. Other structures 
of the corporation have been vandalized and some burnt down”(The National 
Times, January 22, 2019). Such a declaration went a long way to suit the 
separatist agenda of economic sabotage. As such, in reaction to the downward 
shoot of the CDC, Ayaba Cho Lucas intimated; “… we have stopped one of 
the greatest corporations [CDC] they [Cameroon] have been generating 
money from to feed their army against Ambazonia…” (Ayaba Cho Lucas, 
August 25, 2019). 
Considering the fact that the CDC was the pride of the West 
Cameroonians in the 1960’s (Ngoh, 2019), and with the agricultural sector 
accounting for about 63.4% of the gross domestic product of the state of West 
Cameroon (Ebune, 2016),the IG still believes that the agro-industrial 
potentials of Ambazonia remains imminent for the survival of the nation after 
independence. The agro-industrial potentials of No-So are clearly mapped out 
by the Ambazonian leadership in the map below. 
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Agro-industrial Potentials of the Restive Anglophone Regions 
 
Source: https://www.ambazoniagov.org/images/Agro-industy.jpg.  
Retrieved August 22, 2019 
 
2.3. The Cameroon/Nigerian frontiers factor 
‘The correlation between internal conflicts and their cross border 
dimensions is an important variable that should not be neglected’ (Anderson 
& O’Dowd, 1999: 596), and the ‘effective control of the boundaries provides 
the legitimacy and power of the state’ (Flint, 2006: 136).The instability and 
conflict in the border regions is associated with the inevitable involvement in 
their struggle with metropolitan country. It is statistically proven that if a 
country is bordered by a belligerent neighbor, the probability of that country 
being drawn into a conflict is three times higher than for other countries. This 
is particularly common in the case of nations with complex mosaic structures 
of ethnicity (Sevastianov, Laine & Kireev, 2019) as the case of Nigeria and 
Cameroon. The English sections of Cameroon shares a common boundary 
with the Biafra dominated Eastern Region of Nigeria, which had clamored for 
independence from the Nigerian Federation leading to the Biafran Civil War 
of 1967 – 1970 (Chidiebere, 2016).  
Thus, both the Biafrans in Nigeria and Anglophones in Cameroon have 
a common history of secessionist tendencies. Coincidentally, they are 
geographically situated at both sides of the borders between Cameroon and 
Nigeria. This poses a risk factor as one can influence the other if at all a 
possible alliance is not an option. It remains worrisome that 50 years after the 
Biafra civil war, there was the resurgence of protests in the Biafra region (in 
European Scientific Journal December 2019 edition Vol.15, No.35 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
153 
 
2017), calling for independence (News24, 2017), coinciding with the 
heightening of the Anglophone crisis.  This therefore renders the 
Cameroon/Nigeria border very strategic, for, the borders of countries in 
violent conflicts may be associated with risks such as the use of the border 
territories as a corridor for the supply of weapons or as a refuge for the rebels 
(Sevastianov, Laine, & Kireev, 2019), or as a proxy zones for sporadic 
guerrilla attacks. This was evident in January 2018, following an attack on the 
Ekok border crossing connecting Nigeria’s Cross River state and the South 
West Region of Cameroon. The attack saw the use of explosives, with 
assailants reported to have approached from the Nigerian side of the border, 
though refuted by the Nigerian government who claimed to have spotted 
armed men on the Cameroonian side of the border (GardaWorld, January 26, 
2018). Also, according to the Cameroonian military, they intercepted hundreds 
of Nigerians fighters from crossing into Cameroon in October 2017 
(Kindzeka, October 9, 2017). In the same light, in January 2019, three persons 
were arrested along the Cameroon/Nigeria border for allegedly trafficking 
ammunition into Cameroon. As reported by security forces, bullets were 
transported in bags of groundnuts on board a travel agency heading from 
Nigeria to Bamenda in the North West Region of Cameroon (Journal du 
Cameroun, October 25, 2017). One thing remains clear; the separatist fighters 
were ready to exploit the eventuality of a porous border zone between both 
countries.  
With the risk of possible cooperation between the secessionists of both 
countries, especially with Nigeria already acting as a breeding ground for 
Ambazonian leadership, both the Cameroonian and Nigerian governments 
were forced to intensify diplomatic and trans-border military cooperation. The 
outcome of this cooperation was the arrest of the Ambazonian leadership in 
Nigeria and their subsequent extradition to Cameroon (Unindependent 
Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), March 26, 2018). Such 
cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria could not have been avoided for 
three reasons; the first being that they are both threatened by secessionist 
movements. Secondly, the northern parts of both countries remain threatened 
by Boko Haram insurgencies. Thirdly, trans-border regions are normally 
characterized by the dominance of simple and locally limited interactions and 
trade exchanges. Trans-border cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria 
through the town of Mamfe (a Cameroonian border town with Nigeria) has 
always favored improved cooperation between both countries. 
Equally, the Anglophone separatists have been disappointed with the 
Cameroonian government for several economic and geopolitical reasons. 
Considering the fact that Nigeria is one of Cameroon’s major trading 
partners(World Bank Report, 2017), the separatists perceive that in case of an 
independent Ambazonia, trade negotiation with Nigeria will be a top priority. 
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Furthermore, the Cameroon government’s approach to regional integration is 
at odds with the separatists. Cameroon is a founding member of CEMAC 
(Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States) which is 
against the aspirations of the separatist. The separatists prefer Ambazonia to 
be a member of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 
which has a larger market, and with a population of close to 300million people 
(Elong, 2014), with Nigeria (Ambazonian western neighbor) being the most 
populous nation in the sub-region. According to the separatists, the survival of 
an independent Ambazonia rests on access to the ECOWAS region since to 
them, Ambazonia is located in the West and not the Central African sub-region 
(Federal Republic of Ambazonia, July 16, 2019).  
 
2.4.     Demographic Considerations 
‘Significant size of population allows a state to be granted the status of 
a player in the international political field due to the fact that the population 
provides manpower for economic development and military strength’ 
(Bezverbny, n.d.: 6). Looking at Nigeria for example, we see a political giant 
as far as the African continent is concerned due to its population size. 
Cameroon has a total population of over 25million inhabitants, occupying the 
52nd position in the world population ranking, 17th most populous country in 
Africa (World Population Review, 2019) and the most populous country 
within the CEMAC sub-region. Thus, Cameroon’s leading role in the CEMAC 
is partly due to the fact that it is the most populous nation within the sub-
region. Furthermore, because of its French and English colonial history, 
Cameroon is considered a bilingual country with its population speaking both 
English and French (Cameroon Economic Update, 2011). The activities of the 
separatists remained a threat to Cameroon’s demographic status quo.  
Even though no official figure currently exists on the exact population 
size of the English speaking regions of Cameroon, according to the 
Anglophone separatists, the current population of No-So (Ambazonia) is more 
than 8million inhabitants. Based on this figure, they claim the right to 
independence, since to them, it makes Ambazonia to be more populous than 
60 United Nations (UN) member state and18 African Union (AU) member 
states, and with a land size 43,000 sq. km larger than that of 30 UN member 
states and 12 AU member states (Federal Republic of Ambazonia, July 16, 
2019). 
From the above analysis, it can be argued that the quest for secession 
is not all about meeting up with historical blunders or the mere fighting for 
autonomy. The geopolitical undertones cannot be undermined, for, this drive 
is equally encouraged by the presence of natural resources, the geography and 
demography of the restive zones. The resources endowed in these regions and 
in the entire nation have equally influences to great deal Cameroon’s 
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diplomatic and economic relations with the great powers, and hence, their 
positions as far as resolving the crisis is concerned. Thus, the next section of 
this paper seeks to examine the involvement of some of the great powers in 
protecting their interests in the midst of the Anglophone crisis.  
 
3. ‘Great Power’ Geopolitical Stakes In Heightening Anglophone    
Crisis 
It is important to mention that the separatists look up to the great 
powers (America, Britain, France Russia and China) for rescue and eventual 
recognition of their independence. Meanwhile, these great powers recognize 
the territorial integrity of Cameroon and hence No-So as part of the country’s 
territorial space, and validate the government’s efforts in resolving the crisis 
within the framework of a united Cameroon. As part of the plans to realize 
vision 2035, the Biya’s government has further created more foreign 
investment avenues in the country, with the great powers prioritized as major 
cooperation partners. It can therefore be argued that despite the deterioration 
of the crisis, Cameroon remains a chessboard on which the great powers 
continued to manifest their interest through bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. Hence, a critical and deep understanding of some of the great 
power involvements (notably, the former colonial masters of Cameroon) and 
their stance in the crisis requires proper diagnoses. 
 
3.1.      France 
Since independence, France has remained Cameroon’s leading partner 
and the geopolitical interest of France in the territory are abound. Without 
probing into the rich historical ties between both countries, French interest in 
the territory is visible in the oil, cement, wood construction, 
telecommunication sectors in Cameroon. Leading French companies in the 
territory are the Bollore Group in agriculture and agribusiness as well as 
logistics and transportation, Total and Perenco in oil, Orange for mobile 
telephony, Bouuygues, Razel, SCET for construction, just to mention these 
(Business in Cameroon, July 15, 2010), with a consortium of French firms 
working for the improvement of fuel production in SONARA in the South 
West Region since 2017 (Brelsford, 2017, 2017).These amongst others 
therefore explain the strong bilateral ties between Cameroon and France in 
varied domains. As such, the French condemned Separatist attacks on soldiers, 
called for dialogue to ensure the unity of Cameroon, supported peace efforts 
of the Cameroon government during the informal United Nations Security 
Council Meeting held in May 2019(UN Web TV, May 13, 2019), maintained 
military cooperation with Cameroon government, and provided the Cameroon 
government with the much needed finances and logistics to ensure stability 
within the restive regions (Voice of America, February 7, 2019).Meanwhile, 
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the Ambazonian Governing Council (AGovC) considers that the French are 
using Cameroon to exploit their territory and as a proxy to fight Ambazonia. 
The AGovC declared;“… the French government of Emmanuel Macron; the 
unseen but economic and political influence within French Cameroun must 
now understand that their proxy war in Ambazonia is NOT only unwinnable 
but is going to be economically costly on her relationship with Yaounde. 
…”(Ayaba Cho Lucas, for the Ambazonia Governing Council, July 16, 2019). 
However, despite the French concerns on the deteriorating human right 
situations in No-So and the need for dialogue as expressed by the French 
minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs in July 2019 (Journal du Cameroun, 
July 31, 2019),the bilateral relationship between Yaounde and Paris remain 
unabated.  
 
3.2.    Britain  
The Ambazonian leadership strongly believes that the UK, as a former 
colonial power retains responsibility for what happens to its former subjects. 
As such, they looked up to Britain to complete the decolonization process of 
her former territory of British Southern Cameroon, by facilitating the 
recognition of the independence of Ambazonia. But then, ‘successive UK 
governments have resisted this view’ (Lunn & Brooke-Holland, 2019: 
13).However, despite the British support for dialogue, the outcome of her 
bilateral relations with the Cameroon government amidst the crisis spoke 
volume as far as British geopolitical interest in the restive zones was 
concerned. While the UK continued to monitor the crisis, in 2018, British 
Trade Secretary-Liam Fox announced the successful sealing of a £1.5billion 
trade deal secured by a UK oil and company (New Age Company) with 
Cameroon, for the delivery of a floating natural gas project at Etimde in Limbe 
in the restive South West Region of Cameroon. The deal came after a meeting 
between the British Trade Minister-Boaroness Fairhead and the Secretary 
General at Cameroon’s presidency. The deal was described by the Cameroon 
Intelligence Report News as “Blood Gas” (Cameroon Intelligence Report, 
June 9, 2018). 
While battling for Brexit, the British government is highly committed 
to securing geopolitical sphere in order to boost the UK economy after the 
Brexit (Stinson, 2019). This commitment was intimated by the British 
Department for International Trade headed by Liam Fox after the Cameroon 
deal, in the following words;“These projects are just the tip of the iceberg, 
with huge scope for more British companies to target overseas markets” 
(Offshore Energy Today, June 12, 2018).British interest was further buttressed 
by Conservative party member-Peer Baroness, responding for the UK 
government in a debate on the deteriorating situation in Cameroon vis-a-vis 
the oil deal. He told the House of Lords; “we do not see that there has to be a 
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choice between securing growth and investment for the UK, and raising 
human rights…”(Cameroon Intelligence Report, December 18, 2018). 
Meanwhile, according to the AGovC, such a deal was a threat, and interpreted 
Britain’s noncompliance to ensuring the complete independence of their 
former colony [of British Southern Cameroon] as a desire to save Cameroun 
and by extension their economic interest within Ambazonia. Thus, the AGovC 
declared; “…Ambazonia represents a better environment for future economic 
relationship… does not endorse their [British] economic exploration and 
exploitation through agreements with Cameroun, but does not mean that we 
will not engage them [Britain] in our future business relationships… it is 
therefore the moral responsibility for Britain and the world at large to 
recognize the clear violation of not only our history but our RIGHT TO SELF 
RULE. In a free Ambazonia, we will not only guarantee security with the 
global context of fighting terrorism but also provide one of the most healthy 
environment for world trade and commerce.”(Ayaba Cho Lucas, for the 
Ambazonia Governing Council, July 16, 2019). 
Spatial view of the Etimde gas field (MLHP-7) 
 
Source: http://mobile.twitter.com/EmmanuelFreuden/status/1005150740644597760. 
Retrieved August 22, 2019 
 
From the above analysis, it remains problematic to the Anglophone 
separatists that the aforementioned resources are managed by the government 
of Cameroon.  This is compounded by the fact that they do not feel that they 
are adequately benefiting from those resources though hugely found in “their 
territory”. This has therefore resulted to the emergence collective sense regret 
and nostalgia of pre-1972 Anglophone Cameroon.  
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4.    Historical Memories  
In explaining the ‘organic theory’, Frederic Ratzel extrapolates the 
idea of a solid historical link between a people and the area they live. He called 
it; ‘organic territoriality’ which according to him refers to a socially 
constructed idea and perception that a political group is historically rooted to 
the soil they are living on (Vollaard, 2007). The Anglophone separatists and a 
handful of Anglophone Cameroonians still have fresh memories of pre-1972 
West Cameroon (Anglophone Cameroon under the Federal Republic of 1961 
– 1972), characterized by vibrant economic ventures which were later 
rendered defunct by the Ahidjo and Biya’s governments. These historic 
imaginations cannot be negligible in the analysis of the current crisis. This 
view could be buttressed by the following declaration by Sisiku Ayuk Julius; 
“…all our institutions have crumbled, they’ve taken away everything that 
makes us human, … even the simple institutions on our land have been 
destroyed, we had two airports, as we speak you cannot land on a plan to our 
soil, there’s a deep seaport in our land abandoned to a seaport in Douala, 
today there are 38 oil blocks in operation in Cameroon,30 of them happen to 
be in Southern Cameroons. They built a refinery on our land and they 
channeled a depot of the oil on their land…” (Lowell Telecommunication 
Corporation, September 25, 2017).Some defunct economic ventures that 
reflect the historical memories of the separatists are expressed by the 
Anbazonian government in the map bellow. 
   Separatist mapping of defunct economic projects in former west Cameroon 
 
Source: https://www.ambazoniagov.org/images/. Retrieved August 22, 2019 
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As on the map, there are a plethora of economic projects that remain 
in the minds of the separatists and many ordinary Anglophone Cameroonians, 
who accused the government of destroying in favor of Francophone dominated 
institutions. Thus, the vision of reviving such projects in an independent 
Ambazonia remains a fundamental item on the separatist’s post-independence 
agenda. Some of these defunct projects include the following; 
- Cameroon Bank (CB), which guaranteed the financial autonomy of 
former west Cameroon, the Powercam, which was in charge of the 
distribution of pipe-born water in former West Cameroon (Ndobegang, 
2009). 
- The West Cameroon Development Agency (WCDA), which was the 
structure responsible for economic developments in former West 
Cameroon (Ebune, 2016). 
- Other institutions that had been destroyed in favour of those based in 
the Francophone regions included the West Cameroon Marketing 
Board; the Santa Coffee Estate; the Yoke Power Station; the Tiko, 
Victoria and Mamfe sea/river ports, the Tiko, Bisongabang, and Bali 
airports, amongst others (Fonchingong, 2013). 
The above projects were rendered defunct by the Ahidjo and Biya’s 
regime after the abolition of the Cameroon Federation in 1972. Little wonder, 
post 1972 therefore undoubtedly marked the genesis of Anglophone agitations 
and the resultant reawakening of sentiments of a nostalgic historical past. Such 
sentiments provoked the declaration of the restoration of the independence of 
Southern Cameroon (Ambazonia) on October 1, 2017. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, the geopolitical undertones of the Anglophone crisis in 
Cameroon have been examined. This however does not discard the other 
dimensions of the crisis (Historical, cultural etc). A geopolitical analysis takes 
into account the interplay between geography, history and political power. 
These components have been proven to be deeply rooted in the crisis. Hence, 
this paper has examined the strategic geographical location of the restive No-
So; its location at the Gulf of Guinea and its Atlantic coastline which provides 
access to the rest of the world. It has been ascertained that the separatists rely 
on the availability of natural resource such as petroleum for the sustenance of 
an independent Ambazonia. Meanwhile, demographically, they consider the 
population of the No-So as large enough to be granted the status of an 
independent nation. These considerations are undoubtedly great motivating 
factors to the separatists in their quest for an independent Ambazonia. 
However, No-So still remains part of the territorial space of the Republic of 
Cameroon considering the fact that Ambazonia is not recognized 
internationally as a sovereign state. 
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